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TO THE KING.

On the Maritime War against France.

LETTER II.

SIR,

That event, that great source of future danger, which event was anticipated in the former Letter that I took the liberty to address to your Majesty, has now taken place. Austria has been defeated in her own territories. Her sovereign, *in the midst of nearly twenty millions of subjects*, by whom a venal press assured us he was *ardently beloved*, has been pursued to his capital, driven from his capital, beaten out of an entrenched camp in the heart of his dominions, and, after having fled before the enemy, till, in flight, he could, in all likelihood, no longer see a chance of even personal safety, he has besought, and, at last, obtained, under the name of Armistice, a respite, which no reasonable man can possibly consider as of long duration. How serious are the reflections to which this event must give rise in the mind of every Englishman, anxious for the welfare of his country, and especially in the mind of your Majesty ! The delusive hopes, excited, in the minds of the uninformed, by the reiterated misrepresentations and falsehoods of a venal press, with whom the Emperor Napoleon and his army were become subjects of mockery ; these hopes are now vanished, and the people are in a state of mind much more depressed, than if they had never been deceived into bright expectations. They now see the reverse of the picture : they see the immense sums of money, which this war, so fatal to your Majesty's ally, will have cost them, and it is not in nature that they should feel as much zeal in the cause of the war in general, as they felt before this event. They must hate those, by whom they have been so grossly deceived. It is impossible that they should not hate them ; and, as to any belief in them in future, no one, in his senses, can entertain a hope of it. In short, public opinion, public confidence, seems now to have received a greater shock than it ever before received since I have

had any knowledge of public affairs ; which, of itself, is no small evil. But, for this the *people* are not to be blamed ; for, I do not believe, that, in the whole world, there were ever such arts made use of to deceive a people, to pervert the reasoning powers of man, and, at the same time, to debase and corrupt the mind. To those, therefore, who conduct, or direct the conducting, of the venal press (including, perhaps, *nine tenths* of the publications in the kingdom) belongs the whole of the blame of having produced this enormous mischief ; this total want of faith, which, in an hour of real danger, will weigh, perhaps, more against the country than an enemy's army of a hundred thousand men. This is, with me, so important a point, that I cannot refrain from pressing it upon your Majesty's attention. Napoleon owes no small part of his success, and of that power, which has now become so gigantic, to his having never suffered any description of persons to delude his people with false hopes ; to raise their expectations beyond what the real state of things warranted ; to cajole and cheat them, to abuse their credulity, to wear out their patience with promises a thousand times made, and never once fulfilled. There is, too, something, not only disgusting in itself, but greatly injurious to the cause, in the *abuse*, the *vilifying language*, the *foul names*, which the venal press is continually bestowing upon the Emperor Napoleon, when all the world must recollect, that, during the short time that we were at peace with him, a writer was prosecuted, at the suit of your Majesty's Attorney General, who is now your prime-minister, and was convicted of a *libel*, for having *written abusively of this same Emperor Napoleon*, for whom almost every writer seems now to vie with all the rest in devising foul and abusive appellations ; and, what is more, these same writers put forward claims to *loyalty*, to the utter exclusion of all those who do not join in this abuse, and who think that foul words are not the most effectual weapons wherewith to attack, or repel, an enemy so formidable as Buonaparte. The great objection, however, to this mode of warfare is, that it draws off our attention

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from the true state of the case, the true nature of the contest in which we are engaged. As is invariably the case with those, who vent their anger in words, our actions do not correspond with our threats; we so exhaust ourselves in violent expressions, that we appear to be satisfied with that, or, at least, our hostility seems to carry us but very little further. Words cost but little, and, therefore, there are enough to contribute in this way; there are enough, who, like the pensioned poet, Fitzgerald, are willing to make "*sacrifices*," in this way, for the support of the war, and the "*deliverance of Europe*."

In spite, however, of all these sacrifices; in spite of the volumes of abuse, which have, since the prosecution of Mr. Peltier, been, in various shapes and under various titles, published against the Emperor Napoleon; in spite of all the toasts at the Mansion-House, Guild-Hall, the London-Tavern, and else-where; in spite of all this, our enemy has not only gone on increasing in power, but has, at last, arrived at a point, whence your Majesty must naturally fear, that he has not far to go ere he arrive at the complete subjugation of the continent; but, (and this is the great danger, from the cause I am now speaking of) along with this abuse of Napoleon, is industriously spread abroad notions, whence, a great part of the people must be led to conclude, *that he is not an object of dread*. Those who abuse him, having their own selfish purposes to answer; having the passions of others to flatter and indulge, will allow to neither him nor his generals nor his army any sort of virtue, military or political. The same obstinate and perverse spirit, which ascribed the victory of *Marengo* to *DESSAIX*, and the *turning out of the Directory* to *LUCIEN BUONAPARTE*, and which maintained, that, in both cases, Napoleon exhibited all the marks of *folly* and of *cowardice*; that same spirit still prevails; it is still mighty; it still gives us accounts like that of the Austrian "*victory*" of *Aspern*; it tells us, that, at the battle of *WAGRAM*, as it told us at the battle of *AUSTERLITZ*, the Archduke "*led Buonaparté into a trap*." When this spirit will be put down; when the people of this country will be able to get at the truth, is more than I can say; but, my opinion is, that, of all the allies that Buonaparté has, few are more faithful or more serviceable to him, than this base and foolish disposition to disparage, upon all occasions, his talents and his courage,

and especially now, when it is become manifest, that, for no great length of time, can the deception possibly prevail, even amongst the most ignorant classes of society. Leaving the morality of the thing out of the question; or, rather, supposing, that the case warrants a departure from all its rules; still, Sir, the deception is to be reprobated; because, by tending to hush the fears of the people, it must tend to retard the hour, when they shall come to that state of mind, which will be necessary to secure the independence of the country.

That the time is now fast approaching, when this kingdom will have single-handed to contend, for its INDEPENDENCE, and that, too, against ALL THE REST of Europe, under the sway of the Emperor Napoleon; this is, I think, a proposition, which no one, except one of those whose interest it may be to deceive the public, will attempt to deny, unless there be grounds for an opinion, that the mild, and christian-like, and unambitious nature of that conqueror should induce him to make no attempts against us, merely because we have discovered more enmity towards him than any other people have shewn, and because the conquering of us would be more glorious than the conquering of any other people. Those, who think thus, may see nothing new, nothing alarming, in the present state of the war; but, those who think directly the reverse; who think, that, from principles of *self-preservation*, as well as from the passions of envy and revenge, and from a love of glory, Napoleon will seek the subjugation of this kingdom; these persons must perceive, that the battles on the Danube, the subsequent armistice, and the treaty by which it will necessarily be followed, have given to the contest that decided character, which warrants the assertion, that England is now *contending for her existence*.

This being the case; or, at least, it being so in my opinion, the next thing for me to inquire into is, *How we are to maintain this contest?*—There are two modes of warfare, which we may suppose Napoleon to pursue; that of *wasting* and that of *assault*. Suppose him to pursue the former, and us to pursue the same mode of warfare that we now pursue, what, I would like to ask your Majesty's ministers, must be the consequence of his sitting down quietly, giving rest, and, in fact, *peace*, to all his dominions, while he caused us to expend *seventy millions* a year? How many years would this last? How many years

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would it be possible for us to carry on a war of this sort, which, as far as I can see, need not cost the subjects of Napoleon a sum, which, when distributed, would amount to a farthing a head? I have before explained to your Majesty, that all the most useful commercial communications are even now carried on between the several countries, under Napoleon's sway; and that, in fact, as far as relates to the prosperity of those countries, our power, as now used, has no effect. What, then, I should be glad to know from your Majesty's ministers, should we do, were he to resolve upon a mere menacing, a mere paragraph warfare; if he were to *do nothing at all*, but merely to say: "you shall not have peace?" In this case, the question comes to this: *How long we can continue to expend seventy millions a year?*—

But, it is not to be believed, that the ever-active spirit of Napoleon will suffer him to pursue this mode of warfare. On the contrary, if he should, in the course of a year, have finished his work upon the continent of Europe, will he not, as surely as he has life, set himself seriously about his last labour, the fulfilment of his pledge to Lord Whitworth? Upon this supposition, which is, indeed, the only rational one, we have next to take a view of his means of attack.—He will have in his hands, or completely at his command, all the roads and harbours and arsenals that he could wish for; and many more than he could possibly want. His means of building and fitting out and manning ships would be inexhaustible. Even during the present war, he has, I believe, *built two new ships to our one!* Having once settled the continent to his liking, how long would he be in creating a navy far superior to your Majesty's navy in numbers? Not equal in skill, and I hope, not in bravery; but far superior in numbers; and, unless we suppose the French totally incapable of attaining naval skill, we must allow, that experience would soon make them formidable. Painful as it may be to contemplate such truths, it would be folly in the extreme for us to shut our eyes against them. If we look, then, at the naval efforts that Napoleon has been able to make, even during his great military wars, we cannot refrain from being alarmed at those which he will be able to make, when he shall have completely gotten rid of those wars, and shall, at the same time, have added to the ports already in his possession, those of Spain and Portugal.

For my part, I can see no reason (if we pursue our present system of warfare) why Napoleon should not, in a year after he has settled the affairs of the continent, have afloat *a hundred ships of the line*, completely manned and fit for sea. Leaving the Baltic out of the question, there are quite ports and arsenals enough for this purpose; and, as to the other means, hemp, pitch, iron, copper, and timber of all sorts, he will have the greater part of them for a fourth of what they will cost us. Why, then, I would put it to your Majesty's ministers, should he not have such a fleet in the course of *one year*? But, suppose he chuses to stop *three years*? Suppose him capable of restraining, for that length of time, his eagerness to conquer this country; and, that he has 300 ships of the line fit for sea. Suppose this to be the case, in what a situation should we then be? And, if our present mode of warfare be continued, I do not, for my part, see any reason, nor can I discover any reason, why he should not have such a force, and even in *a much shorter time* than that which I have pointed out. Three years is not a long period. The present war has already endured more than six. It, therefore, becomes us to consider, whether we shall have the means of resisting such a force. But, without supposing the existence of any such force as this, no one, I should think, will deny, that, in the course of two years, at the farthest, Buonaparté, upon the supposition of his having settled the continent, will be able to send out *several stout squadrons at once*, or at nearly one and the same time. Supposing him to do this, and to have from ten to fifteen thousand men on board of each, and to make for Ireland. The chances are that *some* of them would reach their destination. To *watch* six or seven stout squadrons would require twice as great a force as we have. In fact, it would, against such a maritime force as we are now supposing, be utterly impossible to guard all the approaches to Ireland, supposing that to be the only object to attend to. But, if Napoleon should have a stout squadron in *every considerable port*, from the *Texel* to *Cadiz* inclusive, there will be nothing, that I can see, to prevent him from engaging the attention of the whole of our force, such as it is now, upon the Eastern coasts of England, while he sails for Ireland from Ferrol, Lisbon, or any of the Southern ports. To blockade the *whole* of his ports, and especially if each contain a stout

and well supplied squadron, will be impossible, even if the weather should always be fair; and to blockade a part will be of no use; and, therefore, unless we adopt a new mode of warfare, it appears to me quite evident, that the time is at no great distance, when the safety of Ireland will depend upon the disposition of the Irish to defend their country against an invasion on the part of the French.

I trust, that no one will dare to tell your Majesty, that there is no danger *now*, because, *hitherto* the threats of Napoleon have proved harmless; that no one will dare to tell you, that, for several years, during the present war, England fought France *single-handed*, and was very far from losing in the contest. The *battle* was, indeed, single-handed, sometimes; though, during this war, France has actually had to fight Austria, Russia, Prussia, Naples, Spain and Portugal, and, by way of interlude, she has disposed of about half a dozen principalities and a popedom. But, whether she had *actually* to fight them, or not, she knew of their being *in existence*. There were, at any rate, *three great powers*, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, who, though not at war with her, *might* be at war with her at any moment, if a misfortune happened to befall her; so that, in fact, we had then all these powers on our *side*, for whatever appearances might be, they all hated France at the bottom of their hearts. —Now how different is the state of things! With the sole exception of Russia, there is no power, worthy of being so called, left upon the continent, besides France; and, it is but too evident, that, before Napoleon again returns to Paris, he will make himself as sure of the obedience of Russia as he is of that of Holland or Italy. He will, in that case, be freed from all apprehension. There will scarcely remain the possibility of interrupting him in his plans with regard to England; and the whole of the mental as well as other means of his vast empire will, without doubt, be directed against this kingdom. I beg your Majesty to reflect on this important change in the circumstances of the war. Pared as the nails of Austria were in her last war, she was still a *great power*; and, if she had, by those shallow-headed politicians, who have so often urged our friends on to their own destruction; if she had remained quiet for the present, she might still have been an object of fear with Buonaparté; but, she listened to the voice of those who hit upon

the bright thought of making in Austria a *diversion* in favour of Spain, and she has paid the price of her credulity. She is no longer a *power*. It is not to be doubted, that Napoleon will use the rights of a conqueror, and bestow the territories of the Emperor Francis, or great part of them, upon those in whom he can confide. As to the *people*, it is evident that their wishes will never be consulted; nor, indeed, does it appear to be at all necessary. They seem to have been very calm and indifferent spectators of the passing events; and so they *must* have been, seeing that 200,000 Frenchmen were permitted to take possession of their capital, and to over-run their country; a lesson, one would think, well calculated to be useful to other governments, if governments were capable of receiving lessons; if any one ever *began to amend* until amendment was too late; if any one ever relied upon any thing but its *power*, till that power was swept away, and till all other means of preservation became useless; if any one ever appealed to any thing but the *sword*, till it was compelled to listen to the sentence: "he who *lives* by the sword shall *die* by the sword." This lesson is, indeed, of a nature, one would think, to strike sensibility even into a stone. *Eighteen millions* of people suffer *two hundred thousand* to take possession of their country, and that two hundred thousand being seven or eight hundred miles from home! What a *lesson*! But, what are we to think, when we are told that these eighteen millions of people were full of "*loyalty*," full of "*enthusiasm*" in the cause of their country? I beseech your Majesty to remark this well; and to bear it in mind, when you hear or read the language of courtiers, or of venal writers, or when, from lungs of contractors and jobbers, you hear those songs, healths, and sentiments, which the unprincipled retailers of news and politics have the impudence to circulate as the effusions of *loyalty*. How often, alas! were we told of the *loyal* songs and tunes at the theatres at *Berlin* and *Vienna*! How often were we told of these proofs of enthusiastic loyalty, and of hostility towards the French! How many thousands of paragraphs have, for our information, been translated from the German papers, in which the writers of that country appear almost to melt away in reading the marks of the people's attachment to their "*beloved sovereigns*." We have now seen, and the sovereigns of Germany have felt, what reliance is to be placed upon such

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professions and protestations; upon this miserable cant of loyalty; while the sovereign of Spain has seen even those of his nobles nearest to his person, lead the way over to his enemy, and lend their hand to the imprisonment of him, whom they had formerly addressed on their knees.

But, if there is no hope in the dispositions of the *people* of Austria, or of any other country, and if Buonaparté should become completely master of the whole of the continent, the ports and naval arsenals included, still it may be said: "the sea is ours: let us take that and keep it, if he take and keep the land." True, and so obviously true, that it requires not a moment's reflection. It is evident, that, unless we can command the sea as completely as he commands the land, we must fall. And, then the question is, *can we do it? If we can, how?* Some persons may think, perhaps, that the discussion of these questions are unnecessary, seeing that *we command the sea now*; but, from the facts, stated in my former Letter, it appears, that we do *not* command the sea now; for, would it not be absurd to call that a command of the sea, which permits convoys of two or three hundred vessels of the enemy to pass unmolested, and to carry on, uninterrupted, between the countries of the enemy, all that sort of commerce which is essential to their mutual comfort and prosperity, and which furnishes that enemy with all the means of forming, in a short time, a vast naval force? Yes; it would be absurdity itself to give to this the name of *an absolute command of the sea*. We have an absolute command upon the sea where we cannot injure the enemy, unless he choose to come out to us; but, as to that sort of command, which is capable of really annoying him, and preventing the growth of his naval power, if we have it, it is manifest, that we turn it to no account.—The *expedition*, now, perhaps, in the act of attacking the enemy, *may*, indeed, do some service; that is a sort of command of the sea, which, *if the effect be proportioned to the means*, must tend to the great object, at which I aim, namely, the destruction of the enemy's valuable commercial intercourse; and, of course, of his means of rapidly raising and sending forth a navy, equal, or superior, in numbers, to that of England. But, Sir, if this mighty armament; this really great force; this, probably, more than half of the force, which

England can command, is intended to do nothing, or should be able to do nothing, but merely capture an island, to keep which will require very great strength and expence, and which, after all, is of no great consequence; if this, even adding to it the destruction of a few ships of war and a naval arsenal; if these are to be the achievements of, perhaps, 80,000 men, by land and sea, and of an expence of millions; if, not to reckon the loss of lives, *such effects* are to be purchased with *such means*, what must be our situation before this day five years? At this rate of proceeding; according to this mode of carrying on the war, the destruction of every French ship will cost us half a million of money. Besides, shall we, when Napoleon has settled the affairs of the continent, *dare* attempt such a mode of warfare? If, instead of his now having a war to carry on in Spain and another in Austria, he had no war but his war with us to attend to; should we, in that case, have attempted this Expedition? It is clear that we should not have dared to attempt it; because, while our force was bent towards the Scheldt, he would have had, from several ports to the Southward, squadrons sallying out for Ireland, or other parts of these islands. If, at a time when Napoleon has wars in Spain and Austria, and while he himself is, perhaps, seven hundred miles distant from our point of attack; if, at such a time, under such circumstances, it requires such an armament to destroy a few French ships, what can we expect to be able to do, when these circumstances shall be totally changed, and when not one circumstance favourable to us, will remain?

That the commercial intercourse between the several countries under the sway of Napoleon is capable of being interrupted, and even destroyed, there can be no doubt in the mind of any man, who is acquainted with what has been done in this way by some few officers of your Majesty's navy, and by ONE in particular, whom it is not necessary for me to name. It is not less matter of certainty, that, as long as our present general mode of warfare continues; that is to say, while our fleets and even our cruizers, lie like so many batteries, or fortresses, upon the water, the commerce of the enemy and his naval resources never can be injured. The vessels of the enemy now know, especially with the aid of the signal-posts upon the shore, the situation of each of our ships as well

as they know the situation of any rock or shoal. To station ships along the coasts of the enemy is, therefore, as useless as it would be to fix so many *buoys* along those coasts. They may, and do, cast anchor and amuse themselves in *fishing* and *shoot- ing*, while they see the immense convoys of the enemy, moving along the shore, completely out of their reach. The ex- pence to us is immense, while the injury, and even the inconvenience, to the enemy is scarcely worth notice. Our commerce with the East Indies costs us more to pro- tect it, in one year, than the protection of this commerce of France would cost in a man's life-time; and, a most striking cir- cumstance is, that the "*annihilated navy of France*" forces us into all this expence for the defence of our commerce with the East, a commerce which Napoleon is too wise to envy us, and of which, or of the dominion out of which it grows, he would not de- prive us if he could, convinced, as he must be, that that commerce and that dominion are amongst the most powerful of those causes, which are working in his favour. Yet, upon this worse than worthless com- merce we expend so much, while he ex- pends scarcely any thing upon the pro- tection of that invaluable commercial in- tercourse, which I have so often described. To assail this intercourse, we want no *additional* force; we want no more ships; we want nothing, that would be expensive, which we have not, in abundance, already; and, indeed, for this great purpose, the force we already have is three or four times as great as it need to be; for, what is the use of a ship lying, with her sails flapping, in the same, or nearly the same place, for months at a time, while, with the naked eye, her commander sees the crowded convoys of the enemy pass by unmolested? That one ship, employed in the *destruction* of this commerce, would be more useful to the country than a thousand ships, employed in *looking* at it, need not be insisted upon; but, to effect this de- struction, there must be, besides that *skill* and *courage*, in which I shall suppose none of your Majesty's naval officers to be wanting, a *motive* sufficient to bring that skill and courage into action, and to cre- ate that perseverance in watchfulness and toil, without which the sort of warfare, here contemplated, is not to be carried on with even a chance of success. The officer, who is to assist in destroying the com- merce of France and her means of cre- ating a navy, must make up his mind to

live amidst rocks and shoals, and, of course, to the running of continual risks. So that, to say nothing of his incessant labour, his life and his reputation must be hourly at stake. But, if these difficulties be fairly encountered, the success is by no means doubtful; and, therefore, all that is wanted, supposing our naval force to be judiciously distributed and employed, is, a *sufficient motive* for the encountering of these diffi- culties; and to shew to your Majesty, that such motive does not, at present, exist, is the chief purpose, for which I have under- taken to address you.

The service, of which I am speaking, is not one which admits of being performed in consequence of mere *orders*. It does not, like the conducting of a convoy, or the fighting of ships, or the attacking of a battery, admit of particular instructions. General instructions may be given; a la- titude to cruize in may be prescribed; but, in almost every case, each single commander must be left to his own discre- tion, as to the place, time, and manner of the service to be performed. Now, Sir, though it might, perhaps, be no very diffi- cult matter to find out one or two or three commanders, in the British navy, who, from a *pure love of glory*, or upon principles of *pure patriotism*, would, in spite of all the difficulties and dangers before-mentioned, undertake and go through the service of attacking repeatedly the coasting vessels of the enemy; yet, I am persuaded, that no rational man would expect to find *twenty* persons, so actuated, even amongst that very excellent class of men, the Bri- tish naval officers. Indeed, such charac- ters may be drawn by poets for the pur- poses of inspiring emulation; but, they are rarely to be met with in real life. It is notorious, that, in our country, men seldom become soldiers and sailors for *any other reason* than because they are *poor*, every man being poor, whose income is deemed, by others as well as himself, insufficient. It is therefore perfectly preposterous; men may talk as they please about it, but it is perfectly preposterous to suppose, that, in order to insure the performance of ser- vices, which necessarily imply great dan- ger of various sorts, besides unavoidable bodily exertion and fatigue, we stand in need of no motive other than that of the *glory* or the *patriotism* of the act. Our practice indeed, our invariable practice, despises this theory; for, while we talk of the glory of having done this or that piece of service, we are pretty sure not to

forget something of a more substantial nature. In short, every thing has its worth in money ; every service has its price ; and, when we talk of *reward*, we always mean money, or money's worth. After viewing the list of noblemen and gentlemen, whose names are to be found amongst the pensioners and sinecure-place men, it would be miserable affectation to expect from officers of the navy in general the performance of services, such as I have been speaking of, without some motive *other than that of glory or of patriotism*, and, indeed, without the motive of gain, in one shape or another. It would be something below affectation ; it would be to suppose those officers senseless brutes ; creatures completely divested, indeed, of what nature teaches to all other animals, namely, a feeling of self-preservation, a love of life, of ease, and of happiness.

There are, Sir, various reasons, why this motive should be but little efficient as to the service I am speaking of, the important service of distressing the subjects of our enemy, and of cutting off the source of his naval stores ; but, the principal one, and the only one, with which I shall trouble your Majesty, at this time, is the little hope, the very faint hope indeed, which, even in case of distinguished success, the practice of the *Prize Courts* leave the successful commander of deriving any advantage whatever from such success ; for, I trust, and, indeed, I am sure, your Majesty will agree with me, that, to receive half a dozen pounds out of a prize worth four or five hundred pounds, ought not to be called an advantage, and that a sum so pitiful ought to be beneath the notice of any man bearing your commission. What I am now going to lay before your Majesty, will, I am certain, astonish you as it has me. I have been accustomed to look upon prizes taken by our ships, as the sole property of the officers and men of those ships, as their reward, their hard-earned reward ; what was my astonishment, then, at learning, that, in many cases, much the greater part of the amount was shared amongst *lawyers* ; and, that, in almost all cases, a very considerable proportion of the amount found its way into this channel. I shall now proceed, without further comment, to give some instances of the distribution of Prize-Money, and, it is, I hope, unnecessary for me to say, that I give them from authentic documents ; and, from these documents it will be seen how erroneous are the opinions, which

have heretofore been generally entertained as to the distribution of Prize-Money.

—The first instance is that of a French prize :

Amount of the Sales -	£.291	11	1
The Charges, including <i>du-</i> <i>ties</i> and <i>Proctor's</i> bill -	229	1	4
Remains for the Captors ! -	62	9	9

The capturing ship was a 38 gun frigate ; and the shares were, according to the present regulation, as follows :

The Captain -	£.10	8	0
A Seaman -	0	1	6
A Landman -	0	1	0

What does your Majesty think of this ? Was I not right in boldly asserting, that your Majesty could know nothing of this ? This was a *French* ship, about which there could be no dispute, or, at least, no litigation ; and yet, out of 291 pounds, the sailor gets but *eighteen pence*, and the Captain not *ten guineas*, while the Proctor's bill alone amounts to upwards of *twenty seven* pounds.—I need not appeal to your Majesty, whether here be a motive sufficiently powerful to induce any one to enter, with zeal and alacrity, upon any service full of difficulty and danger, and having nothing of glory belonging to it.

Another instance is that of a Prize, the sales of which amounted to 1102*l.* out of which the captors had to pay 358*l.* 14*s.* 2*d.* for the *Proctor's* bill alone, consequently one third part of the amount of this prize went to be divided amongst *Judges, Advocates, Registrars, Marshals, Proctors, Surrogates*, and the like ; so that, by the time that the duties and other expences were cleared, there remained, in all probability, not above twenty pounds for the Captain and about half a crown for the sailor.—I am sure, that it is not, because it *cannot be*, your Majesty's wish that your Navy should be thus rewarded.

The next Case presents us with the Gross Sales of a ship and stores to the amount of 745*l.* out of which (it being a *salvage* case) the Captors got 43*l.* 11*s.* 9*d.* as salvage, while the Proctor's Bill amounted to 233*l.* 18*s.* 0*d.* ; thus the people in the courts received more than five times as much as the Captain and his Ship's Company.

The next is a *neutral* Case, where there appears to have been some litigation.

Gross sales -	£.1,415	13	2
Duties -	414	2	0

Carried over - - 1,001 11 2

Brought over - - - -	£1,001	11	2
Paid to neutral master -	391	0	0
	<hr/>		
	610	11	2
Other charges - - - -	44	0	8
	<hr/>		
	566	10	6
Proctor's bill - - - -	410	6	10
To be distributed between	<hr/>		
the Captain and Crew	£.156	3	8

Thus, while the Captain and his crew received *one hundred and fifty six pounds*, the Officers of the Court received *four hundred and ten pounds*; nor must it be forgotten here, that, if the prize had *not been condemned*, the Captain, whose share was, perhaps, about thirty pounds, would have had to pay, out of his own pocket, not only the 410*l.* 6*s.* 10*d.* being the amount of the Proctor's bill, but also the amount of the *damages sustained by the neutral*. Who will, who dares, run such risks?

The next is a Case, wherein the Captain, in obeying the Orders in Council, brought in a neutral ship, part of the cargo of which was good prize; and, your Majesty will now see what was the fruit of his obedience to those orders.

Gross sales of the part of the cargo condemned - -	£13	16	6
Divers charges -	£40	13	8
Proctor's bill -	127	18	7
	<hr/>		
	168	12	3
Gross sales, as above	13	16	6

Loss suffered by the Captain who made the Prize - -	154	15	9
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Now, as your Majesty will not fail to observe, there was no avoiding this loss, without a breach of duty towards your Majesty and the country. Not to have taken this neutral, it being manifestly in his power, would have subjected the captain to a trial for his life. Is it not, then, extremely hard, that he should suffer such a loss, he whose pay is barely sufficient to afford, what, to him, are necessities of life; is it not hard, that he should sustain such a loss, and that the amount of it should go into the pockets of those, who have risked neither life nor fortune? In such a case, surely, the law should be more merciful. In short, Sir, there needs nothing but the statement of this case to do away all our wonder that the sea is still covered with the ships of our enemies,

secret as well as open, and that Napoleon is able to replenish his arsenals, and to build ships of war faster than we can.

I shall cite one more Case, and that I shall give in detail, as far, at least, as I possess the materials. It is that of a ship condemned in July, 1808, the Gross Sales of which amounted to £272. 3*s.* out of which only £59. 16*s.* remained to be distributed between the Captain and his crew, leaving, in the proportion of a 38 gun frigate,

For the Captain - -	£9	19	8
For a Seaman - - -	0	1	4
For a Landman - - -	0	0	11

while the Proctor's Bill alone amounted to £58*l.* 19*s.* 2*d.*, and while, as your Majesty will see from the Items, that the Advocate's clerk, whose business was to open his master's door twice to the Proctor, received, out of this prize, more than three of the seamen concerned in the capture.—Now to the detail:

Gross Sales of ship, stores, and cargo - - - -	£272	3	0
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DEDUCT.			
Pilotage - - - -	4	2	0
Warehouse rent - - -	3	3	0
Labourers - - - -	14	12	4
Prizemaster - - - -	0	14	0
Advertisements for sales, &c.	17	5	0
Ship-keepers - - - -	13	14	0
Brokerage - - - -	2	14	9
Agency - - - -	7	7	2
Incidents - - - -	10	9	6

Paid to private Persons for necessary Services - - -	74	1	9
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Duties - - - -	18	8	6
Fees to the Custom-House	15	16	6
Fees for release from Quarantine - - - -	8	17	6

Paid in taxes, and to tax-officers appointed by Government	43	2	6
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Paid to the Chest at Chatham and Greenwich Hospital -	3	2	11
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Actuary's bill - - - -	26	5	0
Judges' Certificate - - -	2	6	8
Registering the Letter of Attorney, and Amount of Sales at Doctor's Commons -	4	9	0
Proctor's bill - - - -	58	19	2

Paid to law, and other officers, appointed by the Government	91	19	10
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Remains for the Captain and
his crew to share amongst
them - - - - - 59 16 0

That is to say, then, the Captain and the whole of his crew have, amongst them all, only *sixteen shillings and ten-pence* more than the Proctor's bill alone amounts to.—This is what neither your Majesty nor your people could have thought *possible*. For my part, though I was aware of the exorbitant charges of the Admiralty courts, and though I saw, in almost all of them, the offices filled by a deputy, who made a fortune, while the principal, or sinecure-place-man, made a fortune also; though I was aware of all this, even I could not have believed in the existence of what I am now laying before your Majesty.—To state more particulars may appear to be useless; but, a *Proctor's bill* must be a curiosity to a King, and, therefore, I here insert the bill, relating to the afore-mentioned prize.

	£.	s.	d.
Proctor's Fee retained - - - -	0	6	8
Attending the Translator and ordering an Abstract of the Ship Papers - - - -	0	6	8
Paid for same - - - - -	1	1	0
Perusing the Abstract and drawing Case for the Opinion of his Majesty's Advocate whether the Captors could proceed with any prospect of success - - - - -	0	13	4
Fair Copy - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending His Majesty's Advocate therewith, and seeing him - - - -	0	6	8
Paid his Fee - - - - -	2	2	0
His Clerk - - - - -	0	2	6
Perusing the Opinion, Copy for the Captor's Agent, and writing him therewith - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid Carriage of Ship Papers and Examinations - - - - -	0	10	0
Attending and retaining His Majesty's Advocate - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid his Fee - - - - -	1	1	0
Attending before a Surrogate and bringing in Ship Papers and Examinations, and paying Monition, and Surrogate's Fee - - - -	0	6	0
Registrar's Attendance - - - -	0	6	8
Act of Court - - - - -	0	2	8
Filing Attestation - - - - -	0	2	8
Paid for Monition under Seal Stamps and Extracting - - - - -	1	17	8
Copy for Service - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid the Marshal for Service - - - -	0	6	8
Certificate of Service - - - - -	0	3	4
Praying Publication and Act - - - -	0	7	8
Attending in the Registry inspecting the Depositions, and bespeaking Copy - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid for Office Copy thereof, Stamps and Collating - - - - -	5	4	0

Extracting - - - - -	0	6	8
Perusing and Abstracting - - - -	0	16	8
Copy for His Majesty's Advocate - -	3	9	0
Paid for the use of the standing Commission - - - - -	0	8	6
Revising the Abstract and comparing the same with the Examinations, to enable me to draw a Case for the Opinion and directions of His Majesty's Advocate, and drawing such Case accordingly - -	0	13	4
Fair Copy - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending his Majesty's Advocate therewith and seeing him - - - -	0	6	8
Paid his Fee - - - - -	2	2	0
His Clerk - - - - -	0	2	6
Perusing the Opinion Copy for the Captor's Agent and writing him therewith - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending in the Registry inspecting the Ship Papers and selecting such as were necessary to be translated on behalf of the Captors and bespeaking Copy - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid for Translations and Office Copy thereof Stamps and Collating - -	9	13	10
Extracting - - - - -	0	6	8
Perusing and Abstracting - - - -	0	13	4
Copy for his Majesty's Advocate - -	1	5	0
Paid for Office Copy Attestation as to Ship Papers, Stamps, Collating and Extracting - - - - -	0	16	8
Perusing the same, and Copy for his Majesty's Advocate - - - - -	0	6	8
Drawing Allegation for Condemnation of the Ship and Cargo and engrossing the same and Stamp - - -	0	11	8
Fee giving in the Allegation when the same was admitted and Act - - -	0	7	8
Paid filing same - - - - -	0	4	0
Attending and returning the Monition and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
Drawing Case for the Hearing on behalf of the Captors - - - - -	1	6	8
Copy for his Majesty's Advocate - -	0	13	4
Attending him with the Case and Papers, and seeing him - - - - -	0	6	8
Paid his Fee - - - - -	3	3	0
Attending when the Cause was assigned for Sentence on the first Assignment and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
The like on the second Assignment and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
Trinity Term Fee - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending Informations - - - - -	0	6	8
Fee when the Judge at my Petition on motion of his Majesty's Advocate by Interlocutory Decree condemned the Ship and Cargo and Act - - - - -	0	7	8
Interlocutory Fees to Judge Registrar and Marshal - - - - -	2	18	8
Paid the Registrar for drawing the Interlocutory - - - - -	0	6	8
Attending him therewith - - - - -	0	6	8
Deputy Registrar, Marshal and Cryer's Special Attendance, being an Extra Court day - - - - -	0	19	4

Attending in the Registry and be- speaking Copy of the Interlocutory	0	6	8
Paid for Office Copy thereof, Stamps and Collating - - - - -	1	0	8
Paid the Registrar for Acts, Sportu- lage and Attendances - - - - -	1	10	0
The like for Copying and Dispatch -	1	3	0
His Clerks - - - - -	0	7	6
Officers of the Court - - - - -	0	7	6
Extra-judicial Attendances and Con- sultations - - - - -	0	13	4
Proctor's Clerk - - - - -	0	7	6
Letters, Messengers and Sportulage	0	6	8

£. 58 19 2

Thus, Sir, you see, that your Majesty's *Advocate* received, (within £1. 11s. 8d.) out of the proceeds of this Prize, a sum equal to that received by the Captain who took her, and who, in taking her, did, perhaps, run great risk of losing his life, and did certainly run a risk of losing his money, if, by accident, he had any to lose. —I beseech your Majesty to look at the charges, which close this bill. After having charged separately for every attendance; after having made a distinct item of charge for every scrap of paper of every description; after having, as it would seem, rung the changes upon all the terms of separate charge, there come in, at the end, a set of general charges for *attendance* and for *clerks*!

Applying these statements to the great point, upon which I have been addressing your Majesty, can it be, to any one, matter of wonder, that, while this mode of distributing the amount of Prizes exists, the commerce and naval resources of Napoleon remain uninterrupted by our navy? The nature of the service is such as scarcely to admit of any *brilliant exploit*; such as scarcely to afford a chance of any of those achievements, which give officers a claim to *honours* or *promotion*. The service is a service of mere drudgery; of watching and fatigue and care; and, if it hold not out a pretty fair prospect of gain, in compensation for all its toils and its dangers, who will undertake such a service; and, especially what man of great skill (for great skill it requires) will so spend his time, when, without a positive breach of orders, he can avoid it?

It is a circumstance not a little galling, that, when any officer of your Majesty's navy has made a prize, the prosecution of his claim to her must be committed to persons, not of his own choosing; not to *Proctors* (who are merely *Attorneys*;) and

Advocates (who are merely *Counsellors*) chosen by himself, but to a *Proctor* and an *Advocate*, appointed by the ministers of your Majesty; to persons, in short, whom he *may* like, but whom also he may *dislike*, and in whom, however unexceptionable their character, he may have no confidence, whether as to talent or integrity. If, indeed, nothing was at stake but the prize, there might be some shew of reason in saying, that what is taken by the public force shall be committed to the management of none but public officers; but, this is not the case; for, the *private property* of the capturing commander is at stake; that property he may lose, and may, indeed, be reduced to beggary and lodged in a jail by the decision upon a prize; and, shall he not, then, be at liberty to choose his own *Attorney* and *Counsellor*? Shall his property, and, eventually, his personal liberty, be committed to, be wholly left, or, rather, *taken*, into the hands of attorneys and counsellors, of whom, perhaps, he has a bad opinion, however good may be the opinion which others entertain of them? It frequently happens, that a *partner* of the king's *Proctor*, as he is called, has the management of the cause for the *claimant*; so that, the capturing commander, in such case, is compelled to commit his cause, and to impart all his documents and other information, to the same persons, who have the management of the cause *on the part of his adversary*; which, were it not a fact as notorious as it is, never could be believed. This was, sometime ago, complained of in the House of Commons; but, as with respect to most other grievances, no redress was obtained, nor even proposed to be granted.

Under such discouragements, under such a system of deciding upon Prizes, it is not to be expected, that arduous services will be undertaken and prosecuted to success. It is against nature for a man to expose his life, or to harass himself half to death, for the sake of swelling the bags of *Proctors* and *Advocates*. And why should not this evil, this great bar to the exertion, to the utility, of our naval power: why should it not be removed; why should not some mode of deciding upon Prizes be adopted, that would leave to the captors something like a fair chance of compensation for their toil and their danger? Why this *should* not be done there can be no reason; but, why it is not done, there are reasons more than sufficient. The rich offices of *judge advocate*,

proctor, surrogate, marshal, registrar, auctory, together with the endless list of subalterns, form one of the most important heads of ministerial patronage; or, in other words (and here we touch the real source of the evil) these offices are necessary to satisfy the demands of those, who possess that sort of influence, which it is not necessary to name, either to your Majesty or to the country; and which influence, as it has sunk this nation from what she was, will, unless speedily put an end to, complete her degradation and her ruin. How many are the ways, in which this poisonous influence is working for our destruction! But, in no way, perhaps, more visibly than in the one here pointed out, where we see it directly opposed to those exertions, which are necessary to our national safety. Its workings are to be traced to hundreds of other mischievous effects; but, here we see it, at one view, in open hostility, not only to great national interests, but to the very independence of the nation; and, yet, such is the state in which we are, such is the power of this influence, that I should feel much more indignation than surprize at hearing it asserted, that the patronage arising from the profits of the Prize-Courts was of more consequence than the destruction of the commerce and the naval resources of France. It is matter of perfect notoriety, that the far greater part of the fees imposed upon Prizes, go into the pockets of sinecure officers, like LORD ARDEN, for instance. Of the courts of Vice Admiralty abroad, where the charges are, as far as I have been able to ascertain, still more exorbitant than at home; of these courts, it is notorious that the officers reside in England, and have their business performed by deputy. It is equally notorious, that what these sinecure officers receive must be so much taken from the captors of prizes; so that, in fact, the Navy is, in part, at least, employed to gain opulence for them. Is there, Sir, any reason in this? Would it not be far better to pay these Sinecure-place-men out of the taxes, and leave the navy to enjoy the full fruit of its earnings? If there must exist an influence to be counteracted only by grants of places or pensions, surely it were better to take the means, at once, out of the purses of the nation at large, than thus to check those exertions, upon which our existence as a nation may soon be found to depend. I am aware, that there are those, who would rather see the Navy perish than

see this source of patronage abridged; but, if such men are not few in number, I trust they will have no influence in the councils of your Majesty.

I am, &c. &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Botley, 3rd Aug. 1809.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MR. WARDLE.—It appears, that a man of the name of JAMES DIXON, belonging to the Common Council of London, did, some time since the TRIAL of an action, brought by Wright the Upholsterer against Mr. Wardle, give notice, in the Common Council, of a motion for rescinding the VOTE OF THANKS, passed last Spring in favour of Mr. Wardle. This was done, apparently, to feel the pulse, not only of the Common Council, but of the nation at large. The notice was left thus, not acted upon; but, Mr. Alderman GOODBEHERE, Mr. WAITHMAN, and others, took the matter up in a very proper manner; and, in consequence of a Requisition to the Lord Mayor, a Special Court of Common Council was held on Tuesday, the 1st instant.—The Proceedings, though very interesting, are too long for insertion here. I shall therefore content myself with giving the Resolutions that were passed; and, from which Resolutions it will be seen what the public-robbers, those who are endeavouring to decry Mr. Wardle, have gained by this meeting, from which, I hear, many of them expected so much.

“A Common Council, holden in the Chamber of the Guildhall of the City of London; on Tuesday the 1st of Aug., 1809.

“Resolved, That this Court did, on the 6th day of April last, express its thanks and gratitude to G. L. WARDLE, esq. for his conduct in bringing forward and substantiating serious Charges against the late Commander in Chief, which, notwithstanding the majority in his favour in the House of Commons, compelled his resignation. That no circumstance has since transpired which can in any manner lessen the importance of that investigation, impeach his motives, or affect the merits of the case. On the contrary, his unwearied exertions, perseverance and fortitude, under unexampled threats and difficulties, have developed a scene of scandalous abuse and corruption, not only in the army, but in various departments of the State.

"That it has been discovered by the said investigation, that these abuses have extended, not only to the disposal of Church and East India Patronage, but also to the disposal of Seats in the Legislature, and charges have been brought forward and proofs offered, implicating in such corrupt and illegal traffic Lord Viscount Castlereagh, the Honourable Spencer Perceval, and the Honourable Henry Wellesley, all members of the House, and then and now holding ostensible situations in his Majesty's Government, a traffic which, in the language of the Speaker of the House of Commons, "Would bring a greater scandal upon the Parliament and the Nation than this country has ever known since Parliament has had an existence."

"That the said investigation has also led to the discovery, that the said Lord Castlereagh, one of his Majesty's Secretaries of State, and late President of the Board of Control, did, in flagrant breach of his duty as a Minister, abuse of his patronage, and gross violation of the Constitution, place a Writership in the hands of Lord Clancarty, a Member of the same Board, for the purpose of obtaining for him a Seat in Parliament; which fact the said Lord Castlereagh has himself admitted, and notwithstanding there appeared a smaller majority in his favour, than appeared in favour of the Duke of York, in manifest injustice to his royal highness, and gross insult to the Nation, the said Lord Castlereagh still retains his official situation.

"That these attacks upon the vital principles of the Constitution have been made without punishment or censure; and motions for inquiry into such practices have been rejected, upon the alleged frequency and notoriety of them; and Parliament has thereby, as well as by passing a Bill to prevent the sale of Seats in that House, recognized and acknowledged the corrupt influence under which it has been called together, and exercised its functions.

"That it was stated by Mr. Wardle, that there was an Office publicly kept open for the Sale of Places under Government, and although such statement, when made, only excited the derision of Ministers and the House, it has since appeared that the above statement was correct; and his Majesty's Ministers

"have indicted and convicted several persons concerned therein, and such practices were declared in the said indictment to have a tendency to degrade, vilify, and traduce and bring into contempt, the Administration of the Court."

"That by various statements which Mr. Wardle has lately submitted to Parliament, it appears, that by a correction of the frauds, abuses, corruption and peculation, which have been found to exist in every branch of the public expenditure to which inquiry has extended, and a wise and honest application of our resources, the people might be relieved from heavy and oppressive burthens, if not wholly from that inquisitorial and most grievous of all imposts, the Tax upon Income. That his conduct on this occasion seems to have drawn upon him, in a high degree, the malice and rancour of those who are interested in the continuance of these abuses.

"That in the opinion of this Court, individuals who devote their exertions towards exposing and correcting public abuses, are at all times entitled to the support and protection of the country, particularly at the present moment, when there appears an unabating effort on the part of those notoriously under the influence of Government, or who participate in the existing frauds, corruptions and speculations, to cry down, vilify and traduce every man who has courage and integrity to expose such practices, in order to mislead the public, and divert their attention from these great evils."

"WOODTHORPE."

This concluding Resolution contains sentiments peculiarly adapted to the moment. It is the duty of us all, as far as each is able, to stand by Mr. Wardle. An attempt has been made, and is making, to cry down the public cause through him. The villainous language, the atrocious falsehoods, of the hireling press, though certainly surpassing what has ever been heard before, is no more than what was to be expected. It must be thus before the thing be at an end. It always has been so, in all such cases. The state our enemies are in, resembles that of a foot-pad, just when he is mustering up courage to add murder to robbery. Guilt engenders fear; his courage proceeds from cowardice, which is always bloody. These dastardly writers tremble as they attack, and can scarcely prevent their shout from becoming a howl; and, in

short, with the sole exception of those by whom they are prompted, they are the most wretched as well as the most despicable of mankind.

Several topics, owing to the length of the foregoing Letter, must be postponed. —I do not agree with my correspondent, that the country "*vermin*," as he emphatically calls them, are *beneath my notice*; for though I agree with him, that it is most probable, from what we have recently seen, that they were "*blown at me by their masters in town*, as the beggars in Ireland blow lice at those against whom they have a spite;" still, to follow up the comparison, he will agree, I suppose, that it is necessary to *squeeze* the said lice, and not to pretend that they are beneath your notice.

COBBETT'S

Parliamentary Debates:

The Twelfth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Volumes of the above Work, comprising the Proceedings in both Houses of Parliament during the last Session, are in the Press, and will be published with all possible dispatch.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH ARMY IN AUSTRIA.—*Twenty-fifth Bulletin.* (Continued from p. 128.)

Passage across the arm of the Danube to the Island Lobau.

On the 4th, at ten in the evening, gen. Oudinot caused 1,500 voltigeurs to be embarked on the great arm of the Danube, commanded by gen. Conroux. Col. Baste, with ten gun-boats, conveyed them, and disembarked them beyond the little arm of the island Lobau, in the Danube. The batteries of the enemy were soon silenced, and he was driven from the woods to the village of Muhleuten.—At eleven in the evening, the batteries raised against Enzersdorf received orders to begin their firing. The howitzers set this unfortunate little town on fire, and in less than half an hour the enemies batteries had ceased to operate.—The chief of battalion Dessales, director of the bridges, and —, engineer of the marine, had prepared in the island

Alexander, a bridge of 80 toises, of a single piece, and five great ferry boats.—Col. St. Croix, aide-du-camp of the duke de Rivoli, embarked in barges with 2,500 men, and landed on the left bank.—The bridge of a single piece, the first of the kind which has hitherto been made, was fixed in less than five minutes, and the infantry passed over it with great rapidity. Capt. Bazelle fixed a bridge of boats in an hour and an half. Capt. Payerimoffe formed a bridge of rafts in two hours.—Thus, at two o'clock in the morning, the army had four bridges, and had debouched on the left 1500 toises below Enzersdorf, protected by the batteries, and the right upon Vittau. The corps of the duke de Rivoli formed the left; that of count Oudinot, the centre; and that of the duke of Auerstadt, the right; the corps of the prince de Ponte Corvo, the Viceroy and the duke of Ragusa, the guard; and the cuirassiers formed the second line and the bodies of reserve. Utter darkness, a violent storm and rain, which fell in torrents, rendered this night as frightful as it was propitious to the French army, and was about to be glorious to it.—On the 5th at day-break, every one perceived what had been the project of the Emperor, who was then, with his whole army, arranged in order of battle at the extremity of the enemy's left, having turned all his entrenched camps, having rendered his works useless, and thus obliging the Austrians to abandon their positions, and come and offer him battle on the spot that was convenient to him. The great problem was thus resolved, and without passing the Danube on other points—without receiving any protection from the works he had raised, he forced the enemy to fight three quarters of a league from his redoubts. From that moment the greatest and happiest results were presaged.—At eight in the morning, the batteries, which had played upon Enzersdorf, had produced such an effect that the enemy was obliged to let that town be occupied by no more than four battalions. The duke of Rivoli dispatched his first aide-de-camp, St. Croix, against it, who did not meet with a great resistance, and took prisoners all who remained in it.—Count Oudinot surrounded the castle of Sachsengang, which the enemy had fortified, forced 900 men who defended it to capitulate, and took 12 pieces of cannon.—The Emperor then caused the whole army to spread itself along the immense plain of Enzersdorf.

Battle of Enzersdorf.

In the meanwhile, the enemy, confounded in all his projects, gradually recovered from his astonishment, and endeavoured to regain some advantages in this new field of battle. For this purpose he detached several columns of infantry, a considerable number of pieces of artillery, and all his cavalry, as well of the line as the new levies, in order to attempt to out-flank the right of the French army. In consequence he occupied the village of Rutzendorf. The Emperor ordered gen. Oudinot to carry this village, to the right of which he sent the duke of Auerstadt, in order to proceed to the head-quarters of prince Charles, going always from the right to the left.—From noon till nine in the evening the French armies manœuvred on this immense plain. All the villages were occupied, and when the French had reached the heights of the entrenched camps of the enemy, they fell of their own accord, and as if by enchantment. The duke de Rivoli caused them to be occupied without resistance. It was thus we seized the works of Essling and Gros-Aspern, and the labour of 40 days was of no use to the enemy. He made some resistance in the village of Raschdorf, which the prince de Ponte Corvo caused to be attacked and carried by the Saxons. The enemy was every where overwhelmed by the superiority of our fire. This immense field of battle was covered with his remains.

Battle of Wagram.

Strongly alarmed by the progress of the French army, and the great successes which it obtained, with scarcely any effort, the enemy put all his troops in motion, and at six in the evening he occupied the following position:—his right from Stadelau to Gerasdorf, his centre from Gerasdorf to Wagram, and his left from Wagram to Neusiedel. The French army had its left at Gros-Aspern, its centre at Raschdorf, and its right at Glenzindorf. In this position, the day was nearly at a close, and we had necessarily to expect a great battle on the morrow; but this was to be avoided, and the position of the enemy to be intersected, so as to prevent him from forming any plan, by taking possession in the night, of the village of Wagram. In this case, his line, already of an immense length, being suddenly assailed, and exposed to the chances of combat, the different bodies of his army

would be dispersed without order or direction, and we should succeed at an easy rate and without any serious engagement. The attack on Wagram took place, and our troops took possession of the village; but a column of Saxons and a column of French mistook each other in the dark for enemies, and this operation failed.—We then prepared for the battle of Wagram. It appears that the dispositions of the French general and the Austrian general were inverted. The Emperor passed the night in accumulating his forces towards his centre, where he was in person, within cannon shot of Wagram. With this view, the duke de Rivoli moved upon the left of Aderklau, leaving at Aspern a single division, with orders for it to fall back, in case of necessity, upon the island of Lobau. The duke of Auerstadt received orders to leave unoccupied the village of Grosshoffen that he might approach the centre. The Austrian general, on the contrary, weakened his centre, to secure and augment his extremities, which he still farther extended.—On the 6th at day break, the prince de Ponte Corvo occupied the left, having the duke of Rivoli in a second line. The Viceroy connected him with the centre, where the corps of count Oudinot, that of the duke of Ragusa, those of the imperial guards, and the divisions of cuirassiers, formed seven or eight lines.—The duke of Auerstadt marched from the right to reach the centre. The enemy, on the contrary, put Bellegarde's corps in motion for Stadelau. The corps of Collovrath, Lichtenstein, and Hiller, connected their right with the position of Wagram, where prince Hohenzollern was, and with the extremity of the left at Neusiedel, where the corps of Rosenberg debouched in order also, to out-flank that of the duke of Auerstadt. The corps of Rosenberg, and that of the duke of Auerstadt, moving in opposite directions, encountered each other, with the first rays of the sun, and gave the signal of battle. The Emperor instantly repaired to this point, ordered the duke of Auerstadt to be reinforced by the division of the duke of Padua's cuirassiers, and the corps of Rosenberg to be attacked in flank by a battery of twelve guns, of the division of count de Nansouty. In less than three quarters of an hour, the fine corps of the duke of Auerstadt gave a good account of the corps of Rosenberg, defeating it, and driving it beyond Neusiedel with considerable loss. In the mean time, a cannonade commen-

ced along the whole of the line, and the enemy's dispositions were every moment discovering themselves. The whole of his left was secured with artillery.—One might have said, that the Austrian general was not fighting for victory, but was looking only to the means of improving it. This disposition of the enemy seemed so absurd, that some snare was apprehended, and the Emperor delayed some time before he ordered those easy dispositions which he had to make to disconcert those of the enemy, and render them fatal to him. He ordered the duke de Rivoli to make an attack on the village occupied by the enemy, and which somewhat straitened the extremity of the centre of the army. He ordered the duke of Auerstadt to turn the position of Neusiedel, and thence to push on upon Wagram; and he formed the duke of Ragusa's troops, and those of gen. Macdonald, in column, to carry Wagram at the moment the duke of Auerstadt should debouch.—While these proceedings were taking place, information was received that the enemy was making a furious attack upon the village carried by the duke of Rivoli; that our left was out flanked by 3,000 toises, that a brisk cannonade was already heard at Gros-Aspern, and that the space between Gros-Aspern and Wagram seemed to be covered with an immense line of artillery. There was no longer any room for doubt.—The enemy had committed an enormous fault, and we had only to profit by it. The Emperor instantly ordered gen. Macdonald to form the divisions of Broussier and Lamarque in columns of attack. He ordered the division of Nansouty to be supported by the horse-guards, and a battery of 60 guns belonging to the guards, and 40 of different other corps. General count Lauriston, at the head of his battery of 100 pieces of artillery, marched at a trot against the enemy, advanced without firing to within half gun-shot distance, and there opened a prodigious fire, which silenced that of the enemy, and spread death among his ranks. Gen. Macdonald then advanced at the *pas de charge*.—The general of division Reille, with the brigade of fusiliers and sharp-shooters of the guards, supported gen. Macdonald. The guards made a change of front, in order to render this attack infallible. In an instant the enemy's centre lost a league of ground; his right became alarmed, and perceiving the dangerous position in which it was placed, rapidly fell back. The duke of

Rivoli, at that moment, attacked it in front.—Whilst the rout of the centre struck consternation into the right of the enemy, and precipitated its movements, the left was attacked and out-flanked by the duke of Auerstadt, who had carried Neusiedel, and who having gained the elevated plain, was marching upon Wagram. The divisions of Broussier and Gudin covered themselves with glory.—It was only then ten o'clock in the morning; and those who had the least penetration saw that the fate of the day was decided, and the victory was ours.—At noon, count Oudinot marched upon Wagram, to assist the attack of the duke of Auerstadt. He was successful, and carried that important position. After ten o'clock, the enemy fought only to effect his retreat; at twelve this was manifest; it was conducted in disorder; long before dark the enemy was out of sight.—Our left was posted at Jefelsee and Ebersdorff; our centre upon Obersdorf, and the cavalry of our right extended their posts as far as Shonkirchen.—On the 7th, at day-break, the army was in motion, and marching upon Kornenbourg and Wolkersdorf, and had some posts near Nicolsbourg. The enemy, cut off from Hungary and Moravia, had been forced to fall back upon Bohemia.—Such is the narrative of the battle of Wagram, a battle decisive and ever memorable, in which from three to four hundred thousand men, and from twelve to fifteen hundred pieces of cannon, contended for great interests, upon a field of battle, studied, planned, and fortified by the enemy for several months. Ten pair of colours, 40 pieces of cannon, 20,000 prisoners, including between 3 and 400 officers, and a considerable number of generals, colonels, and majors, are the trophies of this victory. The fields of battle are covered with the slain; among whom are the bodies of several generals, and among others, one called Norman, a Frenchman, a traitor to his country, who prostituted his talents against her.—All the enemy's wounded have fallen into our hands. Those whom he abandoned at the commencement of the action, were found in the adjacent villages. It may be calculated that the result of this battle will be that of reducing the Austrian army to less than 60,000 men.—Our loss has been considerable; it is estimated at 1,500 in killed, and from 3 to 4,000 wounded.—The duke of Istria, at the moment when he was preparing for an attack with the cavalry, had his horse shot dead by a cannon

ball, which fell upon his saddle, and slightly grazed his thigh.—The general of division, Lasalle, was killed by a musket ball. He was an officer of the greatest merit, and one of our best light cavalry generals.—The Bavarian general Wrede, and generals Seras, Grenier, Vignolle, Sahuc, Frere, and Defrance, were wounded.—Colonel prince Aldobrandini was wounded in the arm by a musket ball; the majors of the guard, Dausmenil and Carbeneau, were also wounded; the adjutant commandant, Duprat, was killed; the colonel of the 9th infantry of the line fell on the field of battle.—That regiment has covered itself with glory.—The officers of the staff are preparing a return of our losses.—A particular circumstance incident to this grand battle is, that the columns nearest to Vienna were only about 1,200 toises from it. The numerous population of that capital covered the turrets, the steeples, the roofs of the houses, and every elevated situation, to witness this spectacle.—The emperor of Austria left Wolkersdorf on the 6th, at five in the morning, and ascended a tower, from which he had a view of the field of battle, and where he remained until midnight. He then set off in all haste.—The French head-quarters were transferred to Wolkersdorf, on the morning of the 7th.

Twenty-Sixth Bulletin, dated Wolkersdorf, July 9.

The enemy retreated in the utmost disorder. We have collected a part of his baggage. His wounded have fallen into our hands; we have already counted more than 12,000; all the villages are filled with them. In five or six hospitals alone we have found more than 6,000.—The duke de Rivoli, pursuing the enemy by Stokerau, is already arrived at Hollabrunn.—The duke de Ragusa had at first followed on the road to Brunn, which he quitted at Wolkersdorf, in order to take that of Znaim. At nine o'clock this morning he met at Laa a rear-guard, which he routed: he took 900 of them prisoners. He will be to-morrow at Znaim.—The duke of Auerstadt is arrived to-day at Nicolsbourg.—The emperor of Austria, prince Anthony, with a suite of about 200 chariots, coaches, and other carriages, slept on the 6th at Erensbunn, the 7th at Hollabrunn, the 8th at Znaim, whence they

set out at nine of the morning. According to the relation of the country people who conducted them, their dejection was extreme.—One of the princes de Rohan was found wounded on the field of battle. Lieut. field-marshal Wursakowicz is among the prisoners.—The artillery of the guard covered itself with glory. Major Aboville, who commanded, was wounded. The Emperor has made him general of brigade. The chief of a squadron of artillery, Graner, has lost an arm. These intrepid artillerymen displayed all the power of this terrible weapon.—The horse chasseurs of the guard charged, and drove back on the day of the battle of Wagram, three squares of infantry. They took four pieces of cannon. The light-horse Poles of the guard charged a regiment of pikemen. They took the prince of Auersperg prisoner, and captured two pieces of cannon.—The Saxon hussars d'Albert charged the cuirassiers d'Albert, and took their colours. It was a very singular thing to see two regiments belonging to the same colonel fighting one against the other.—It appears that the enemy is abandoning Moravia and Hungary, and is retiring into Bohemia.—The roads are covered with the men belonging to the landwehr, and the levée en masse, who are returning to their houses.—The losses which desertion is adding, to those the enemy has sustained in killed, wounded, and prisoners, are concurring to annihilate his army.—The numerous letters which have been intercepted are a striking picture of the discontent of the hostile army, and the disorder which reigns in it.—Now that the Austrian monarchy is without hope, it would evince being ill acquainted with the character of those who govern it, not to expect that they will humiliate themselves as they did after the battle of Austerlitz. At that epoch, they were, as now, without hope, and they exhausted all their protestations and oaths.—During the day of the 6th, the enemy sent a few hundred men to the right of the Danube to make observations. They re-embarked after having lost a few men killed or taken prisoners.—The heat was excessive on these days. The thermometer was almost constantly at 26 degrees.—There are great quantities of wine. In one village 3,000,000 pints were found. It has happily no bad quality.

(To be continued.)